Tensions have increased sharply between the United States and Russia since the breakdown of the Syrian ceasefire two weeks ago. Although there have been no incidents involving forces from either side, there has been much irresponsible talk on both sides. There has also been a concrete escalation, mostly on the side of the Russians, which increases significantly the threat of an unintended (or deliberate) incident.

The cease fire never had much chance of lasting long, but it broke down more quickly than even the pessimists believed possible. Secretary of State John Kerry accused the Russians of continuing their indiscriminate bombing campaign in Aleppo while being unable or unwilling to reign in al Assad’s loyalist troops. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused the Americans of being reckless or deliberate in their bombing of an “ISIS outpost” in Al Hasakah which turned out to be Syrian government troops, leaving over 60 of them dead. Both sides accused the other of bad faith: both sides are right.

The Russians are continuing their bombing campaign in Aleppo, using the justification that the al Nusra Front is in the city and not protected by the ceasefire as they are a jihadist group. Unfortunately, the Russians are not too worried about collateral damage, including civilians, children, hospitals, schools, etc. making the carnage in Syria’s largest city truly catastrophic. It is also true that the Russians don’t control al Assad’s troops: not only is the Syrian Army intent on making hay while the sun shines, i.e. while the rebels are on their back heel and reeling from heavy air bombardment, many of the most engaged forces aren’t even of the Syrian Army. The Iranians have sent heavy reinforcements of troops to Syria, perhaps several brigades; while there are Hezbollah and Alawite militias that respond only nominally or not at all to central control. Expecting the Russians to turn these forces “on” or “off” as if they were all in the Red Army is ludicrous.

Meanwhile, the Americans did bomb a Syrian Army outpost near Deir ez Zour, which is in the far eastern part of the country near Iraq and within the “normal” area of operation for Coalition air forces. Coalition forces depend upon a number of information sources including ground spotters, ELINT, drone footage and satellite imagery to develop target matrices so it is entirely possible that a mistake was made and targets were misidentified, or that there was a deliberate decision to target these troops somewhere below the level of Central Command. Whether it was an accident, deliberate on the part of the Americans or perhaps the Kurds using their allies to get a little payback at loyalist troops is unlikely to be revealed; but the truth no longer matters, the incident evaporated what little trust their was between the Russians and the Americans.

The irresponsible talk began immediately and is as bad as anything from the height of the Cold War. Russian military officers advised that any repeat of the US bombing “mistake” would be countered forcefully, and also warned that Russian troops had the means to defend themselves and were now embedded in many loyalist formations. The civilians in Moscow went much further, saying that once shooting started between Russian and US forces in Syria, it wouldn’t be contained there.
The Russians have not been the only ones engaging in dangerous rhetoric. Democratic Presidential candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton has openly discussed the possibility of a no-fly zone in Syria. This is reckless braggadocio who someone with Mrs. Clinton’s long experience should not engage in. Firstly, establishing a no fly zone requires a Security Council resolution to be legal ; neither Russia nor for that matter China will authorize such a measure and they both possess a veto. Secondly, assuming the US decided to brazenly violate international law – and not for the first time – the only airplanes we would be attempting to ground are those of the Syrian and Russian Air Forces. Are we going to start shooting down Russian MiGs and Sukhois because they ignore our demands to exit the no-fly zone? A no-fly zone that will be unrecognized by anyone and have no legal validity. In order to establish a functional no-fly zone, the US would also have to neutralize the Syrian regime’s air defense systems, which is a fancy way of saying bombing the missiles and radars and killing the Russian operators.

The American media has also been beating the drums of war just about as hard as it possibly can. The Wall Street Journal wrote :

“The Obama Administration and its media allies dismiss these developments as swaggering by a second-rate power, or as signs that Mr. Putin is being trapped in an Arab quagmire of his own making. But the Russian understands that he is creating military facts on the ground that increase the leverage of his allies in any future talks. The leaders in Israel, Turkey and the Gulf States will no doubt appreciate the shifting balance of power the deployment reflects. There is a war on. Russia’s side is winning, and the allies of America and the rest of Europe are losing.” (emphasis added)

This is a simplistic and dangerous assessment of the situation in Syria, wholly irresponsible on the part of the Journal. Though it is not just the WSJ; papers like the New York Times and Washington Post have been almost as belligerent in their reporting as well. The implication that US and Russian proxies are competing directly against each other and that their objectives are mutually exclusive is untrue. While the US is supporting some Syrian rebel fighters, and would like to see Bashar al-Assad out of power, the removal of the regime is not a US strategic priority. Let me say that again to be perfectly clear: the United States is not in Syria to topple Assad. We are not there to set up a Kurdish state or to see any one faction in the civil war gain a victory. We are in Syria exclusively to destroy the Islamic State. The question of who wins the Syrian Civil War is largely (though not totally) irrelevant.

Talk of direct intervention or imposition of a unilateral no-fly zone is merely tough talk for election-year consumption; that, or else Mrs. Clinton has gone off her rocker. Attempting to unilaterally establish a no-fly zone will either lead to a US climb down and humiliation or else war with Russia. In this one particular case, I am forced to agree with Mr. Trump’s assessment of Syria, even though he said it for all the wrong reasons: the US and Russia should be cooperating more, not less, in Syria. Our objectives are not mutually exclusive; Russia is as much opposed to ISIS as we are, and is fearful of the return of Chechen jihadists from Daesh-controlled territories. For that matter, Mr. Assad and his Shiite Alawites also view the Sunni extremist group as anathema.

What exactly are US objectives in Syria? If we’re not there to topple Assad and only want to destroy the Islamic State, why does it seem that the US is simply muddling along? Why does it seem that the Russians can act “decisively” while we cannot?

Comparison of Russian and US Objectives in Syria

It is worth taking a moment to remember the situation in 2015 just prior to Mr. Putin’s decision to send troops and aircraft to Syria. The situation facing the Assad regime was deteriorating rapidly and the loyalist army was close to collapse. Numerous facts support this assessment:

• Islamic State forces had handed the Syrian Army a number of important defeats, including the capture of Palmyra, Al Quaryatayn and Tiyas AFB, then advanced to within 5 miles of the vital M5 supply highway linking Damascus with Al Qusayr and the north;
• Al Baghdadi’s forces had captured the last government-held oil field at Jazal, depriving Assad of a vital supply of hard currency and fuel for his military, and had also expanded their foothold in the southern Qadam district of Damascus;
• The Islamic State had captured the strategic northern city of Al Hasakah, forcing the loyalist garrison to evacuate. The city was soon retaken with substantial Coalition air support, but the primary beneficiary was the Kurdish YPG, who took over 90% of the city;
• Other rebel groups, especially the Al Qaeda affiliated Nusra Front, made critical gains in Idlib Governate, taking the Abu Al Duhur air base after a lengthy siege and the key mountain village of Jisr al-Shughour. This and the other villages of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains are the gateway into the Alawite heartland; from there you look down on the coastal plains all the way to the sea. If the Alawite heartland crumbles, al Assad’s position would collapse immediately;
• The Syrian government and army had to introduce numerous and ever more draconian measures against desertion and draft-dodging. Alawite mothers had been holding back their youngest sons rather than having them go off to die a gruesome death at the hands of the al Nusra Front or ISIL. This indicates that the manpower situation was getting desperate and that the measures introduced had not proven particularly successful at reversing it.

Strategic reverses on the battlefield, a looming threat to the heartland and a deteriorating manpower situation: if Putin hadn’t intervened, Assad’s government might have collapsed with frightening suddenness and rapidity. As Syrian rebels began to attack into the coastal towns and villages in the north, Assad’s most loyal Alawite soldiers might have decided to abandon Damascus in order to defend their families and homes, leaving the capital unguarded. Into that vacuum steps the Islamic State and soon the black flag is hanging from the great Umayyad Mosque, built by al Walid in the 8th Century. At that point, all bets would have been off. Russia’s hand was forced. They moved quickly and decisively because they had to in order to avoid a collapse of the Assad regime. They acted from a position of weakness, not of strength.

Russia benefits from a far less complex strategic problem in Syria than the United States. They have one ally: Bashar al Assad. They have one objective: prevent his downfall. Russia runs into difficulty only when it attempts to negotiate ceasefires that its other key allies – Assad himself, Iran and Hezbollah – are not interested in. However, compare this with the difficulty of the American position:

• The US is working in conjunction with various allies and partners, most of whom despise each other, and in some cases, are shooting at each other or each other’s proxies;
• The Turks and Kurds have restarted their civil war in Anatolia and it has since spilled over into Syria; but the YPG is the most effective and most pro-Western ground force we have in either country;
• We are allied with the Iraqi government, who are supporting Shiite Hashed militias, who are in turn supported by Iran, who is the mortal enemy of our principal Sunni ally, Saudi Arabia;
• We appear to be committed to the downfall of al Assad (though we’re not really doing anything to speed it along), but we can’t possibly accept the two most powerful groups who would be likely to succeed him, ISIL and Al Nusra. There are no Sunni Arabs in Syria we can honestly support except perhaps the Free Syrian Army, and they’re no longer in the major leagues;
• We are committed to destroying the Islamic State, but can’t be seen as anti-Sunni or anti-Arab, even though most of our allies are Turks, Kurds and Shiites;
• And even though we are allied with Turks, Kurds and Shiites in our efforts against the Islamic State, we can’t actually help them finish the job. If the Kurds grew too strong, the Turks and Iraqis would object; if the Shia grew too strong, the Turks and Saudis would object; if the Turks grew too strong, everyone else would object.

The US situation is so convoluted and full of contradictions, it is a wonder we accomplish anything at all. It is impossible to act decisively with so many opposing interests to balance.

The US has two overarching strategic priorities in the region that supersede all others:

1. First and foremost, the United States must prevent any single power from dominating the Middle East. That includes “friendly” powers like Turkey and Saudi Arabia as well as “hostile” powers like Iran or Russia. This does not imply that the US must dominate the region, only that a balance of power is required;
2. Emerging from the first priority, the US should seek to deter any transnational movements that could emerge to unify the peoples of the Middle East under a single banner. Today, it is the Islamic State with its call for a modern Caliphate spanning the Arab world; however, it could just as easily be a secular Pan-Arabist movement, such as the one inspired by Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Russia’s strategic aims do not go so far as those of the United States, being rather focused on maintaining a key ally and bases in the region. The ability to destabilize Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean from Syria are also important considerations, which is why the Russians continue to court the Kurds as part of the “anti-ISIS efforts.” Dominating the region is beyond Russia’s capabilities for the time being and Mr. Putin realizes that his state remains too weak to project enough power so far from home. Demonstrating their ability to destabilize the region and promote the Syria-Iran relationship, allows Moscow great leverage: they can facilitate or complicate the achievement of US objectives in the Middle East. The former always comes at a price, one which has been too steep for Washington until the moment.

What is at stake in Syria goes beyond the preservation or removal of Bashar al Assad. A loyalist victory would leave Syria financially and militarily ruined and even more ostracized from the Sunni Arab world. It would be beholden to and dependent on Iran and Russia for its military defense, and possibly China for its reconstruction and future development. There would likely be permanent garrisons of Iranian troops and Russian aircraft and ships in the country; this would upset the balance of power in the region by elevating Iran. With Iraq remaining fractured and ineffective for the foreseeable future, the principle blocker to Iranian expansion will remain unavailable.

In summary, the Russians have performed impressively and given notice of their power projection capabilities to the immediate neighborhood including those nations that do not share a land frontier with Russia. This is a clear message directed not only at places like the Baltic States and Finland, but also Sweden, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan and even Japan, with whom Russia still has frontier disputes. Ukraine and Georgia need no such demonstration, of course. This was undoubtedly an ancillary benefit to the deployment, but an important one that Mr. Putin will undoubtedly exploit to the full.

Implications for American Strategy

From a tactical perspective, US efforts are today focused on the battle for Mosul. Central Command should broaden their priorities and plan for the isolation of the Syrian and Iraqi battlefields. This means cutting the last links between the two areas controlled by Daesh forces. There was already a failed attempt to take Al Bukamal in Syria in a daring air mobile operation using Syrian rebel forces; another attempt should be made on the Iraqi side of the border at Al Qa’im using a mixed force of Iraqi Army units and US forces. The other key area of interest is in Syria at Al Hawl-Al Shadaddi. These two towns are already receiving much attention from Coalition airstrikes, but they should become the primary axis of advance of Kurdish troops. Successful liberation of these three towns would split the Islamic State in two and weaken both halves, making the flow of supplies and reinforcements between them far more difficult.

At a strategic level, the Obama Administration needs to be focusing on possible endgames in Syria and Iraq. What happens when the Syrian Civil War ends? What happens when Daesh is defeated? What will happen over the intermediate and long-term in the region after these conflicts? Scenario analysis of the likely outcomes to the Syrian Civil War yields four probable endgames to the conflict, all of which bear substantial risks for US strategy. These are:

• Scenario 1: Decisive Loyalist Victory. A complete victory by the al Assad regime over all opponents and the re-establishment of loyalist control over the entirety of Syrian territory implies a strategic victory for Russian and Iranian interests. The long-term presence of Russian and Iranian military advisors will have a substantial negative impact on all of Syria’s neighbors who are US allies, including Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Israel, as well as on Saudi Arabia and Egypt;
• Scenario 2: Partial Loyalist Victory. The Loyalist regime may defeat the principal elements of the Sunni rebellion, yet not be able to re-exert complete control over all Syrian territory, particularly in the Kurdish areas. This outcome would lead to continued tension between Damascus and the Kurds as well as a deteriorating situation with Turkey. It is not a stable outcome in that the Kurds and any Syrian rebel enclaves would be weak and highly exposed to renewed military action by government forces in the near future to eliminate them;
• Scenario 3: Protracted conflict. There is no reason at this point to believe that the civil war is nearing a conclusion. So long as the major global and regional powers are willing to continue, and even escalate, their support to their Syrian proxies, the conflict could continue for a number of years. This scenario is also inherently unstable and runs the risk of uncontrolled escalation between any of the involved parties (US v. Russia, Saudi Arabia v. Iran, Turkey v. Syrian government or other combinations). A protracted conflict also would exacerbate tensions within the European Union, which continues to be the focal point of war refugees;
• Scenario 4: Decisive Rebel Victory. The overthrow of the al Assad government by the Syrian rebel forces would be a very serious blow to Iranian and Russian interests, but would not necessarily lead to a stable situation in Syria. The elimination of the loyalist forces would most probably lead to a new spate of fighting between the different elements composing the Syrian rebel forces as they vie for control of the country. It would also continue the anarchic environment in which the Islamic State has thrived, making the destruction of ISIL a more complicated and drawn out matter.

The most probable outcomes today appear to be Scenarios 1 and 2. It is very difficult to conceive of a Syrian rebel victory without either: a substantial increase in military supplies to them, especially anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry, or else a withdrawal of Russian and Iranian forces from the combat zone. Neither appears likely in the near future. While neither of these scenarios are particularly palatable to US interests in the region, they are not unbearable and they are preferable to the risks of uncontrolled escalation into a US-Russian conflict.

US plans should therefore focus on mitigating the impacts of “losing Syria”. One mitigating action is to conclude the war against the Islamic State as soon as possible and in the best possible position to affect the situation on the ground in Syria and Iraq. That means capturing territory in Syria before it can be liberated by loyalist forces. This depends heavily on Kurdish YPG forces, who are the most effective pro-Western fighting force on the ground; but it will provoke major opposition from Turkey, who does not want “Rojava” to expand any further. A careful balance of interests and management of guarantees to both the Turks and Kurds makes this an extremely difficult strategy to implement successfully.

Another mitigation involves major commitments to shore up the stability of Iraq and keep Baghdad out of Iran’s sphere of influence. The best way to achieve both is to ramp up the deployment of US troops to Iraq, including the long-term basing of substantial US military assets in the country, including ground troops. Although I have argued against this step in the past, the situation as changed and the deterioration in the region demands a re-evaluation of the logic of troop withdrawal. The return of US ground troops to Iraq would have a three-fold purpose:

1. Act as neutral guarantors of peace and stability in Iraq between the Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish segments of the population. Staging US forces in the Sunni Corridor, perhaps at the al Assad Airbase near Al-Baghdadi, and others in Erbil, could calm the fear of locals regarding possible reprisals and abuse by the Iraqi Army or militia forces;
2. The presence of US combat forces would act as a deterrent to Iranian ambitions and a counter to any Russian and Iranian forces remaining in Syria. It would demonstrate US commitment to keeping Iraq as an independent actor rather than an Iranian proxy;
3. There could conceivably be a combat mission for US ground troops in order to speed up the elimination of the Islamic State from pockets like Rawah, Al Qa’im, Haditha or Tal Afar. American units should not bear the principal burden of combat, but could be used selectively to strike high value targets or to stiffen Iraqi and Kurdish units who might be limited in their ability to deliver knock-out blows to local ISIS garrisons.

It appears that the Obama Administration has already begun to implement the first mitigating action. This week, Iraqi and Kurdish forces have begun the advance on Mosul, the lynchpin of the Islamic States control over Iraqi territory. Advancing with the frontline of troops are approximately 300 US Special Forces, coordinating the air support that is a critical element in the success of the operation. It is possible that additional US troops will be made available both for the Mosul offensive and other key advances against Islamic State positions. These troops will stiffen the Iraqi and Kurdish troops committed to the battle and demonstrate American commitment to their success. It will also allow the Iraqi government to avoid the US of Shiite Hashed militias, which could provoke a Sunni backlash and further fragment the country. A more visible and permanent deployment of 2 brigade combat teams – approximately 8,800 men – could have a major impact on fostering stability in Iraq after the defeat of ISIL.

However, no one should be fooled: this implies a long-term commitment by the American people to stabilize the country we destabilized in 2003. If we pursue this strategy, we could very well be there still a decade from now. But the timing for such a strategic shift is good: although President Obama is unlikely to authorize a permanent deployment of such a large body of US troops due to legacy issues, we will have a new President in 4 months’ time. Mrs. Clinton would have no such qualms about reversing her predecessor’s withdrawal decision.

Nevertheless, America risks falling into a Syria fixation. We need to remind ourselves that our purpose is not to depose Assad, nor are we there to “beat the Russians” as if this were a hockey match. Successfully promoting our national interest in the quagmire of the Middle East will require cool, clearheaded calculation, not the jingoistic drum-beating of the yellow press and election-year political stumping.