On the 28^th of June, elements of the rebel force called the New Syrian Army executed a highly ambitious attack to seize the key border town of Al Bukamal. The town sits astride Highway 4[1], the Euphrates River and is only 6 kilometers from the Iraqi border and the town of Al Qa’im. It is an agriculturally important and prosperous location and a key transit point for the overstretched Islamic State. Denying them use of the highway would have obliged Daesh to use more circuitous routes, over unimproved roads or dirt tracks through more hostile terrain, substantially adding to the logistical burden and further isolating the Syrian and Iraqi branches of the Caliphate.

The New Syrian Army was flown in by Coalition helicopters to an abandoned military airfield 5 kilometers north of the town. There were also sleeper cells in Al Bukamal itself who assassinated the Islamic State governor and sent up a call for resistance to Daesh. As the NSA troops moved south from the airfield, convoys of Ahmad al-Abdo Martyrs Brigades and Battalions and Jaysh Usud al-Sharqiya fighters joined the fight from the south west. A diversionary attack by Iraqi forces on the neighboring border town of Al Qa’im failed to materialize, but the NSA nevertheless managed to capture the Ayshat al-Khayri Hospital on the northern outskirts of town, as well as positions between the town and airbase. Then things went wrong.

The bungled feint on Al Qa’im only served to warn ISIS and highlight the main effort of the attack, without tying down any of their fighters. The call to a rising failed to mobilize the civilian population, while the ISIS fighters in town dug defensive positions and successfully repelled NSA efforts to penetrate the urban center. At this point the situation was stalemated: the application of decisive force could tip the scale in favor of either force. Unfortunately, the decisive force was the arrival of ISIS reinforcements, who recaptured the airfield and proceeded to roll-up the NSA positions. Rather than being wiped out, the Syrian rebels retreated overland with their al-Abdo and al-Sharqiya allies; bitterly resenting their abandonment by the very Coalition forces who had airlifted them in the first place.

How much truth is in this accusation? Any air mobile operation, deep behind enemy lines, automatically carries with it a high probability of failure. The attacking force is far from their bases and sources of support, while the enemy is near theirs. To be successful, these operations must make maximum use of surprise, violence and speed to secure their objectives quickly while the attacker retains the initiative and before the enemy can react. It is also imperative to isolate and distract the enemy as much as possible to prevent or delay reinforcement of the key sector. Without all of these factors working in conjunction, even a very powerful striking force can be stalemated or defeated, as the Allies learned to their cost in World War 2 operations like Operation Market Garden (Arnhem) and Operation Shingle (Anzio).

In the case of the Battle for Al Bukamal, three of the four key factors seem to have gone wrong from the outset.

• The failure of the Al Qa’im diversion did nothing but draw a circle around the more important fighting in Al Bukamal, surrendering the element of surprise and allowing ISIS to identify the key point of weakness and move troops there;
• The initial assault was not carried home aggressively enough. After taking the some outlying farms and buildings and then the hospital, NSA forces met the main line of Daesh resistance. After suffering some casualties, they withdrew rather than press home the attack. At this point, the speed of the assault fell to zero;
• The pause might have been in called in the misconceived expectation of the planned civilian rising; but this never occurred. All that was achieve was to surrender the initiative to ISIS;

However, there was a clear expectation the Coalition aircraft would be expected to isolate the battlefield by making ISIS road transport a deadly risk; as well as substantial close air support to break up clusters of Daesh defensive positions to facilitate the attack. Did the Coalition deliver on these?

By looking at the daily strike reports published by Central Command, we can see that Coalition air forces did increase their targeting of Al Bukamal and its surrounding townships, including Al Qa’im and Rawah in Iraq. In the three weeks prior to the air assault, the Combined Joint Task Force had delivered an average of 4 total strikes against those three cities; during the battle itself, this figure quadrupled to 15 strikes. It then fell back to 6 strikes on the week following the withdrawal of the NSA forces.

A quadrupling of air support may sound like a very substantial increase in firepower, but how does that compare with other key theaters? At the same time that the Battle for Al Bukamal hung in the balance, the Coalition was supporting two more major operations: the siege of Manbij by Kurdish forces in Northern Syria, and the drive to isolate Mosul from the south by Iraqi and Kurdish troops. What level of support did these two critical offensives receive from allied aircraft? Substantially more:

The 15 strikes near Al Bukamal-Al Qa’im are roughly similar to the 17 strikes hitting near Qayyarah, south of Mosul. This does not count the additional 25 strikes near Mosul itself. However, they both pale in comparison to the siege of Manbij, which received more strikes in one week than Al Bukamal and Al Qa’im in the entire five week span of the analysis. Clearly, US efforts are very focused on the success of Kurdish efforts to cut the northern access route to Turkey for the Islamic State.

It is too much to deduce from this analysis that the Coalition “abandoned” the New Syrian Army at Al Bukamal; but it is probably true to say that they considered this a long-shot operation from the start. The Coalition could have mobilized aircraft from Al Asad military airfield, near al Baghdadi, and launched 60 sorties in support of the NSA attack. This might have made a difference; but it is also possible that it would have led only to a lengthier stalemate rather than to victory. With the Islamic State dug-in to the densely populated urban center of town, any direct strikes to dislodge them would have certainly resulted in civilian casualties. This has led in the past to much grumbling by Iraqi troopers who have to do the difficult house-to-house fighting by themselves due to Coalition rules of engagement intended to minimize civilian death.

Once the Daesh garrison successfully beat off the first tentative attack by the New Syrian Army, the Battle of Al Bukamal was transformed into a battle of attrition, like Ramadi. By failing to capitalize on their initial advantages, the NSA lost the opportunity to take Al Bukamal by storm, much like Ar Rutbah was retaken by the Iraqi Army in May. While Coalition air support was not overwhelming, it is likely that no amount of air support would have rescued this operation from failure once Daesh decided to dig in. It is nonetheless a regrettable lost opportunity to have dealt another heavy blow in the war against the Islamic State.

[1] Highway 12 in Iraq