The Syrian Civil War, the fight against the Islamic State, the anarchy in Yemen, terrorist bombings in Lebanon and Kuwait, the renewal of hostilities between Turkish authorities and the PKK: these events cannot be viewed in isolation. Although each has its own unique and specific causes, actors and circumstances, they all must be viewed through the lens of a great struggle for power that has been characterized as a Sunni-Shiite sectarian clash reminiscent of the Thirty Year’s War in Europe[1]. Just like that earlier conflict, the religious element is overlaid by national state rivalries: a Shiite from Syria doesn’t view the conflict in the same light as one from Iraq, Iran or Yemen. This is further complicated by numerous strains of thought within Sunnism and Shiism, neither of which are homogenously orthodox[2], as well as by the ethnic diversity of the populations involved.

In summary, Iran is leading a Shiite coalition which is attempting to expand its influence from Persia to the Levant and making inroads into the Arabian Peninsula; while Saudi Arabia is presenting itself as the defender of Sunni Arabs against Persians and Shiites, and attempting to break out of this potential encirclement.

The proximate causes of this internecine war are diverse, but include:

1. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Communism delegitimized one of the only realistic alternatives to religious identification, that of anti-imperialist socialism, which lay under the appeal of Nasserism and the Baathist parties of Syria and Iraq;
2. The American invasion of Iraq and deposition of Saddam Hussein destroyed the principle bulwark of Arab and Sunni power against the encroachment of Persian, Shiite Iran. The United States failed to reconstitute an Iraqi state powerful or cohesive enough to fulfill this role; indeed, the US insistence on turning Iraq into a parliamentary democracy as a post hoc justification of the invasion ensures the opposite, for the majority[3] of the Iraqi population is Shiite while another significant percentage (the Kurds) are hostile towards any centralizing authority;
3. The relentless agenda of “interventionist democracy”[4] – pushed by a segment of the North American and European establishments – led directly to the Arab Spring, which barring Tunisia, has been a universal disaster. In a nation like Iraq, democracy would guarantee a Shiite government and the movement of Iraq into the Iranian orbit; in places like Libya or Lebanon[5], it would lead to anarchy. These considerations have never been important however[6].

Although some commentators have gone back as far as Sykes-Picot to explain the current situation, there is little evidence to support this. The post-World War 1 borders survived for a century with almost no push for revision after colonial independence; and there is plenty of research to indicate that national identity among the people of the Middle East is strong[7]. This is particularly so in places like Egypt, Turkey and Iran – what could be considered “historic nations” – but even in Syria and Iraq, Pan-Arabism stopped being a viable alternative identity after the 1970’s. But historical revisionism is not necessary as an explanation or at least, not back to World War 1: the conflict between Arabs and Persians over the lands between the Mediterranean and the Tigris River goes back at least to the Abbasid Revolt of the 7^th Century, or we could go back to the fight between pre-Christian Romans and Sassanians in the 3^rd Century. It is driven by geography and reignited by the destruction of the structures that had kept the conflict frozen for a century[8].

A more appropriate analogy would be the Spanish Civil War. When Generals Sanjurjo and Franco began a military insurrection against the legitimate government of the Second Republic on July 17 1936, they expected a rapid coup and dictatorship in the style of Miguel Primo de Rivera’s de facto government from 1923 to 1930. Instead, the Republic survived the first shock and rallied around the defense of Madrid and from there the war dragged on another three bloody years. Arising from purely local circumstances in Spanish politics, the war immediately took on an internationalist character: both sides were caught up in the great tide of events shaping the world in the 1920’s and ‘30’s. The right-wing insurrectionists were “on a crusade against Bolshevism and Jewish Free Masonry” even though the Communists held no power in Azaña’s Republican government[9]; meanwhile the Republic’s cry was a rally against Fascism, even though the leading generals were not, strictly speaking, fascists.

Outside powers were drawn into the conflict almost from the beginning. The Germans and Italians both supported the military uprising, though for different reasons. For Berlin, the war distracted the Western Powers while the German economy recovered and rearmament began in earnest. The Italians became involved because they assumed the fighting would end quickly and provide them with prestige and a useful client in Spain, which just shows how little they knew about their Spanish allies[10]. The Soviet Union also wished to distract the Germans, who were the principal threat to their regime, and Stalin needed time to purge the Party and Red Army of traitors, Trotskyites and counterrevolutionaries. It was, in fact, in everyone’s interest to drag out the fighting as long as possible; except the Spanish.

The Syrian Civil War has followed an analogous pattern: in response to peaceful and moderate protests calling for more political participation, President Bashar al Assad used heavy-handed, brutal tactics to suppress the demonstrators. As more civilians died, elements of the Army rebelled in Aleppo and there was a moment when al Assad might have tumbled from power quickly under the shock of events. But the regime recovered its balance, received infusions of Russian and Iranian supplies and fought back. The civil war quickly began to take on a sectarian character because that is the great tide that we are living through: the universalist secular ideologies have been replaced by universalist religious ideologies. As in the Spanish civil war, the moderate groups have been marginalized; to receive Saudi weapons, you have to pass the Saudi religiosity test.

The roles of the Condor Legion, the Corpo Truppe Volontarie and the Soviet advisors in the Spanish war have been all replicated in Syria. Even the downing of the Russian Su-24 fighter-bomber by a Turkish F-16 has its parallels; the Italians had taken to torpedoing merchant ships going into Republican ports with “mysterious” submarines of undeclared nationality, but after the HMS Havoc was attacked, the British promised to persecute and destroy any submarine by any power found attacking neutral merchant vessels or British warships. The Russians are happily testing equipment and ordinance in the best training conditions possible, which are those of actual combat. They are practicing long distance deployments to combat theaters and proving they have the logistical means to keep their units supplied and in action. They are throwing the kitchen sink at the Syrian rebels: not just Su-24 and Su-25 ground attack aircraft either, they are flying missions with strategic bombers from Southern Russia[11] and launching cruise missile attacks from the Caspian Sea Fleet. I don’t know what the Russian version of “make hay while the Sun shines” is, but Ivan has taken it to heart.

The fighting has increasingly drawn in powers that were not or only peripherally involved. These additions have served to prop up one side or another in a series of escalations: Russian began sending munitions, spares and equipment to bolster al Assad; then the Gulf States began to arm the Syrian rebels. Shiite Hezbollah and then Iran entered the fray; then the Americans bolstered the Iraqis and Kurds when the rapid expansion of the Islamic State threatened to overwhelm them. Turkey was unable to resist being sucked into the conflagration when Ankara felt the risk of a Sunni defeat or Kurdish victory became unacceptably high. And when supplies were no longer sufficient, both the Americans and the Russians sent in air forces to prevent their ally’s collapse. Now the Gulf States have responded to Russian pressure by helping drop the price of oil, in an effort to tank the Russian balance sheet, and by supplying advanced anti-tank weapons to the Sunni rebels. The only redlines so far left uncrossed are the provision of MANPADS or direct military intervention with ground troops. As long as this dynamic continues, the conflict is unlikely to resolve itself short of a decisive intervention or mutual exhaustion.

Decisive intervention has been difficult to arrange for a number of reasons: the Shiite coalition is constrained by being the weaker of the two sides, while the Sunni coalition is constrained by the mutually conflicting strategic interests of its members. It is worthwhile reviewing what these are at a high level:

The most significant item is the one that is not there: no one has “destroying the Islamic State” anywhere close to the top priority. That is because ISIS serves a useful purpose for the moment; it halts the spread of Shiite power while those who oppose Iranian influence figure out how to neutralize it more permanently. The United States has signed a nuclear agreement with Iran because it does not want to invade the Islamic Republic or let it continue developing a bomb; but that does not mean we are suddenly best buddies nor that we want to have Iran dominant in the Middle East. But left unchecked, the size, population and strength of the Persians would almost certainly achieve this hegemony, as they have repeatedly in centuries past. ISIS is doing the checking, though we cannot admit it.

The United States would prefer it otherwise: we would undoubtedly prefer a strong, unified, yet democratic Iraq that was tolerant and inclusive of its ethnic minorities and which could again stand as a bulwark against Iranian encroachment. We aren’t going to get that. So the US is pushing Turkey and Saudi Arabia to get more involved, to send in ground troops[12]. But like the Spanish Civil War, all the really important players have an interest in keeping the war going; no one is prepared to see the other side triumphant and we have not yet reached the level of mutual exhaustion to bring about a good-faith negotiation.

The war will end at some point. But many more people are going to have to die first; in Syria and in the West.

Sources and Notes

[1] Numerous foreign policy experts have used this analogy in the past: Richard N. Haas, President of the Council of Foreign Relations; Professor Larry Goodson, of the US Army War College; former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta also picked up on it.

[2] There is no single body in Islam like the Catholic or Orthodox Churches in Christianity that define and defend orthodoxy. The uluma, who act as the guardians of legal and religious purity in Islam, are a far more diverse set of people.

[3] Estimates vary: the CIA Fact Book places the figures at 65% Shiite, while the Pew Research Center uses a lower figure of 51%. However, since the Sunnis are further divided between Arabs and Kurds who see eye-to-eye on next to nothing, in practice the difference is irrelevant.

[4] “Interventionist democracy” is the political agenda of imposing democratic forms upon nations, regardless of the local conditions and their aptitude for a republican or democratic form of government, as well as by the use of military force to overthrow the existing (usually authoritarian) order to pave the way for “democracy”

[5] Which is precisely what happened in Lebanon until all sides, exhausted by war, agreed to a non-democratic power-sharing agreement.

[6] Interventionist democracy, in theory, brings with it new elites who are beholden to their “liberating” Western partners and who therefore can be expected to open their markets to certain Western corporations in which said partners own stock or receive funding from. Their dependency also brings with it lucrative military contracts, as the previous armed forces have often been destroyed and need rebuilding. So far in 2015, the U.S. government has approved the sale of $115 million worth of arms to Kuwait, $150 million to Bahrain, $845 million to the U.A.E., and $19.5 billion to Saudi Arabia. Jeffrey Goldberg, “Ashton Carter: Gulf Arabs Need to Get in the Fight,”as The Atlantic, 6 November 2015

[7] Pew Global Attitudes, “Muslim-Western Tensions Persist,” Pew Research Center, 21 July 2011

[8] With the notable exception of the Iran-Iraq War (1980 to 1988), which should have conclusively demonstrated to American policymakers the essential “gatekeeper” role played by a strong, centralized Iraq in limiting Iranian influence; one of the main reasons George H.W. Bush and James Baker III didn’t make the colossal blunder of occupying Iraq after the First Gulf War.

[9] The Communist Party participated in the Broad Front center-left and leftist parties that made up the government of the Second Republic, but they were a minority and held no important posts in June 1936. Anarcho-syndicalism and Trotskyism were much more important politically and had far more members than the Bolsheviks did; it was only the war and the support of the Soviet Union that elevated the Spanish Communists to the forefront before the conflict ended. See Peter Preston, “The Spanish Civil War,”

[10] Franco had no intention of being anyone’s client, not Germany’s and certainly not Italy’s. He demonstrated this at the height of Hitler’s power in November 1940 when he and Hitler met; Franco declined to enter the war on Germany’s side and lived to die in his bed because of it.

[11] David Axe, “Russia Pounds ISIS With Biggest Bomber Raid in Decades,” The Daily Beast, 17 November 2015

[12] Fernando Betancor, ”Outside the Box: Has the US Revealed the Sunni Endgame in Syria, Iraq?” Common Sense, 14 December 2015