The chart shows lukewarm support for military action in the common defense, but nations like Poland and the United Kingdom have large margins of uncertain respondents: 18% and 14% respectively, which could turn into support if a crisis were actually declared. It makes sense in Poland’s case: they have too much experience dealing with Russians to walk blithely into another conflict with them. It is telling how little uncertainty there is in the other large NATO countries: 9% in Italy, 5% in Spain, 4% in Germany and 0% in France.
The article goes on to qualify that, despite substantial differences in public opinion, in practice the governments of the NATO member states are working very closely together. The author’s conclusion is that Europeans expect the Americans to step in first and only then would support for intervention grow to majority levels.
Perhaps. But that is a big “if” upon which to rest an alliance. Levels of support might not increase once a conflict starts, even with an American intervention. The fact remains that the frontier has moved to the east from the European “core” by over 1,700 miles since the end of the Cold War: from East Germany to the new Russian border. It is not difficult to get people to spend on defense when the wolf is at the door – though it may be too late by then – but from 2,000 miles away the Russians recede in the mind against the more pressing problems of jobs, cuts to social programs, immigration, and the pot holes on my street corner.
Even if Europeans did rally behind the US and support collective action, what are they expected to support NATO with? Europeans militaries have been gutted far past the point of prudence. The “big powers” of France, Britain and Italy couldn’t even deal with the paltry air defenses of a fifth rate state like Libya, and the US had to intervene much against President Obama’s desire and good judgment to prevent a fiasco. American precision-guided munitions, logistics and C3ISTAR won the Libyan campaign with minimal losses and collateral damage.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, the removal of the danger from the Heartland by 2,000 miles, shifting demographics towards an aging population, and the impression that there would “never again” be a major war in Europe all contrived to ensure that NATO governments year-in, year-out voted for social spending over military spending. Of the major NATO nations, only France and Great Britain have consistently maintained their commitment to fund defense at 2% of GDP over the past 15 years and both of those nations have serious gaps in their defense capabilities – supposed to be made good by their NATO allies – that limit their effectiveness as a stand-alone fighting force.
Systematic and long-term underinvestment has left Europe with an enormous structural defense deficit: over 330 billion euros. That’s equivalent to one-third of Spain’s entire GDP. That is reflected not only in reductions in formations and personnel; but also antiquated equipment, elimination of key systems and capabilities, cutbacks in training and live fire exercises, reductions in inventories of munitions and spares, and deterioration of serviceability levels. To make good these deficits would require European nations to not only raise their spending to the 2% threshold, but to actually increase it substantially above that for a number of years: something which is inconceivable in today’s political environment.
Under-investment is almost as bad as no investment at all; after a certain point, militaries lack sufficient capabilities to operate on their own. It’s like baking a cake: you can reduce the proportions of the ingredients to a certain point, but if you get rid of the eggs or the yeast entirely, the whole thing collapses into an untidy mess. The once mighty Bundeswehr, the bedrock of Western European defense against the Warsaw Pact, is a perfect example of the transformation of NATO’s militaries into a paper force. Berlin has reduced its military to the point that it cannot even defend Germany, much less project power into Eastern Europe. Half the tanks would breakdown before reaching Poland and they would be without air cover because the Luftwaffe’s Eurofighters lack the parts for sustained air operations. This is the NATO partner that will defend the Baltic States from the 6th and 20th Armies of Russia’s Western Military District?
The solution I have proposed in the past is the creation of a European Defense Fund. It would operate in precisely the same manner as the Regional Development Fund that has been so successful in updating infrastructure and living standards across wide swathes of Southern and Eastern Europe. Member states far removed from Russia and unwilling to make the major investments that would allow them to contribute meaningfully to a distant conflict in the Baltic States would pay into the fund, which would pay out to those members closer and more willing to bear that burden, but who might lack the resources to do so effectively on their own. Specifically, this means the Baltic States, Poland, Romania and Norway though other nations might also receive supplementary funds to bolster key capabilities or installations, like in Denmark, Iceland or the United Kingdom.
What makes this concept work is that it requires a far smaller contribution from the contributor states to make a big difference for the recipients than raising their own force levels does. Imagine that Western European states, with the exception of Great Britain, contributed the equivalent of 0.25% of their GDP to the European Defense Fund. That would raise 27.7 billion euros, based on 2014 GDP data. These funds could then be distributed to the key “front-line” nations most in need of bolstering their defense capabilities. The results would be dramatic:
Poland and Norway, which are relatively large economies and who devote close to the 2% minimum, could have their annual defense budgets boosted to 4% of GDP. Romania, another large nation but one whose military has suffered substantial under-investment, could be increased to 5% of GDP. Finally, the vital but economically weak Baltic States could have their defense budgets increased to the equivalent of 6% of the GDP. And there would still be 241 million euros let-over in the EDF for overhead and administrative costs as well as to roll-over into the following year.
All this could be achieved by a modest 0.25% increase in Western Europe’s government spending.
Nor should this be considered as money lost by the contributor nations. Poland, Romania and the Baltic States are all major importers of weapons systems from Western Europe. The contributors could confidently expect to get much of their money back in the form of more arms deals and a greater percentage of arms deals won than currently. It would not be a precondition of receiving funds, which would go against WTO rules, but let’s just say that everyone would expect European manufacturers to gain an edge.
Europe should act decisively and the United States should push our allies in this direction. Nothing encourages an aggressor so much as division and weakness; an enhanced commitment to NATO and financial demonstrations of intra-European solidarity will go far to preventing war on the continent’s periphery and could save a vast expense of blood and treasure in the future. A European Defense Fund is the right solution: expecting a distracted Western Europe to take up the burden again is nothing short of dreaming. Put the tools in the hands of those that need them and who are close enough to see the Bear’s claws to fear them.
 Jeremy Shapiro and Anna Newby, “Not ready for a post-American world: European views on NATO,” Brookings, 16 June 2015
 Greece and Turkey have consistently met the 2% threshold; Bulgaria did until 2010; Romania until 2005. Poland has consistently been just under the floor at 1.8%-1.9%.
 Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Ireland, and Denmark.